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Moral Jailing is usually construed as a personal flaw, but there is another construction: where 
morals fail people, where our moral precepts are silent. The author of this article argues that 
this happens nowadays where technological advances, such as genetic engineering in 
medicine, raise moral questions but get legal answers. By responding to the legal issues 
involved, the moral questions are pre-empted. This results in answers drawn from legal 
categories, often with commercial perspectives, but misses the larger moral domain. 
I AN EXAMPLE OF A KIND OF PROBLEM - KINDS OF QUESTIONS 
Suppose Jenny Gee wants a child of her own, without sex or artificial insemination and 
so decides to clone herself and become her own best friend. Assuming all goes according to 
plan, we get a Jenny-done, physically independent, socially differentiated but as if a 
monozygotic twin, of an entirely different age. 
I do not propose to pursue philosophical questions about personal identity. Such 
questions are spurious without a normative framework about the accountability and 
responsibility of people as interacting agents. I give the example to illustrate the extent to 
which our moral beliefs are limited when it comes to new situations which do not fit into 
our familiar patterns. The following questions indicate the kinds of topic I will focus on: Do 
Jenny's parents have moral obligations to Jenny-done; in particular, do they have the same 
responsibilities to Jenny-done as they did to Jenny, given that in the genetic sense Jenny­
clone is as much their daughter as is Jenny herself? What about the more legal issues: Could 
Jenny's father be expected to pay child support? Who gets named on the birth certificate as 
the parents? Then again, what about Jenny's geneticist physicians, what standards of 
professional ethics ought to be applied to them? Can they just say that she was fully aware 
of the medical and genetic aspects involved, and they had her informed consent, or should 
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they obtain Jenny's parents' consent too? Is there some further ethical model which human 
cloning shares with, say, novel treatment and new techniques? 
I doubt many of us have answers to these questions, but that does not mean that the 
questions are frivolous, nor that answers are unnecessary. We may still be a considerable 
way from cloning ourselves, but it has already been done with at least one sheep. 
The issue for my paper is whether ethics is limited in ways which result in there being 
moral questions which lack moral answers. My thesis is that not only is morality 
incomplete, but that it is necessarily so. And, as a practical implication of this moral failing, 
the questions are instead being approached and answered piecemeal within other social 
institutions, typically from legal perspectives, and from economic and political perspectives. 
While these other institutions do and must have important roles, their answers will reflect 
the particular norms and principles of such institutions. This is not to say that these social 
institutions are devoid of moral reflection, only that such reflection is not paramount and so 
moral aspects may give way to the need for a decision to be rendered in adversarial 
litigation, or for economic policy to be framed for national spending. 
There is an asymmetry between the roles of the court and the roles of ethicists when 
confronted with the propriety of human action. Particular, identifiable individuals seek a 
ruling from the courts when there is a specific dispute or when the legality of a course of 
action is uncertain. The judge must be pragmatic, and must render a decision which is 
consistent with existing law and also resolves the issue between the parties. In particular, 
the job falling to the courts is to decide on issues arising in the technologically new areas. 
Yet, it is apparent that there is a reticence among judges to render judgment on what they 
clearly identify as raising moral concerns, such as determining who can do what with 
genetic material and information, or with frozen embryos. It is not open to a judge either to 
assert that the issue is too fraught, or that all parties are in error in their submissions, 
unless he also imposes his own determination on the parties. But such pragmatism is not 
required of the ethicist; the ethicist may serve best by challenging assumptions and 
producing hypothetical counter-examples without the urgent need to reach any conclusion, 
and certainly not a conclusion for the particular individuals in their particular 
circumstances. 
II COMPLETENESS, THE RULE OF LAW AND MORAL MATHEMATICS 
A Completeness and the Rule of Law 
Two classical theories of ethics have been of enormous influence. They are: firstly, the 
Kantian school, which looks to rational determination of universal moral duties; and, 
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secondly, the consequentialist utilitarian approach, which looks to causal chains and their 
instrumental effects relative to some ultimate, intrinsically valuable end.1 
In identifying oneself as a Kantian or utilitarian, one relies on the preferred theory to 
provide the moral answer to any moral problem. In this way one is presuming universality, 
stability and permanence. One is providing an account of how one will make future 
decisions, not merely reporting on how one has made decisions in the past. As with 
declaring oneself a Leeds United supporter, one is doing a lot more than describe an aspect 
of one's life up to now- one is indicating a strong likelihood of a continued interest in and 
favouring of the team, on the basis of which others are able to predict one's future conduct. 
The support is a rationale for one's conduct; so too the adherence to the particular ethical 
theory is both rationale and relevant evidence for predicting future decisions and actions. It 
is as if the domain of morals and the right answers are already there, somewhere, just 
waiting to be called into service. 
Ordinarily we have very few ethical problems- we usually do know what to do and 
why - but when struck by a problem, we want the theory we espouse to indicate a 
resolution. We want it to be normative and prescriptive, not only descriptive. From either 
point of view - deontological and consequentialist - it would be a significant defect if there 
were things that we identify as moral issues, but where there is no moral answer. As 
I will not be describing these two theories in any great detail. Kant's approach is basically the 
Universality view, set out in I Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, translated as 
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics (Abbott translation) lOth ed (London, Longmans, 
Green & Co Ltd., 1965). There Kant maintains that one ought "Act only on that maxim [ = 
personal reason] which you could at the same time will should become a universal law". He 
focuses on the rationality of moral action, to the exclusion of the effects wrought by one's action. 
He states that "Moral laws ... in contradistinction to natural laws, are only valid as laws insofar as 
they can be rationally established a priori and comprehended as necessary. In fact, conceptions 
and judgments regarding ... conduct have no moral significance, if they contain only what may be 
learned from experience ... ; one is ... misled into making a moral principle out of anything derived 
from this latter source." He is famous for taking the high moral road, for the principles that one 
must always treat others as "ends in themselves and never as a means [to an end]" and for 
autonomy. Modern day Rights theories trace back to Kant, with rights as the corollary of duties in 
a Hohfeldian schematic. By contrast, the utilitarians are teleological in outlook, looking to cause 
and effect chains, with a view to the attainment of some intrinsic value, rather than rationally-
focused. They set some overall goal or goals as having intrinsic value - often the Greatest 
Happiness of the Greatest Number - then gauge moral worth of an action instrumentally. They 
engage in arithmetic like accountants toting up columns and seek to calculate whether there is an 
overall surplus of good over bad outcomes, relative to the ultimate goal. This approach is the 
counterpart to cost/benefit analysis in economics. The most famous proponents of utilitarianism 
are Bentham and Mill, both of whom, along with John Austin, had a strong influence in the 
development of modern positivist jurisprudence and the decline of Natural Law in the common 
law jurisdictions in the 19th century. 
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indicated,2 Kant construes morals in terms of rationally necessary moral duties. These are 
principles under the single Categorical Imperative: Act only on that maxim whereby thou 
canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.3 The litmus test for an action 
is whether one's reason applies equally to all rational, moral agents. This is referred to as 
the universalisability requirement. But in Kant himself and in his commentators very little 
attention is paid to whether the litmus test for moral behaviour - universalisability - rests 
on universal law in a sense that goes more like this: For every morally challenging situation, 
there is some moral law. Similarly, consequentialists need their theory to generate 
prescriptions. So they too must go beyond the accountant analogy where the tallying is done 
on previously created records, and must establish matrices axiomatically, to generate future 
prescriptions, where there are no current records. This requires that the matrix for the 
arithmetic precede the problem. So then, let rre consider whether ethics is or ever can be 
considered as complete- that is, whether for absolutely any and every question, there exists 
some appropriate moral answer. 
The arguments in favour of the completeness of ethics are along the lines that any 
particular moral theory does in fact have answers to most moral questions, and in theory 
provides a decision procedure or rubric for dealing with any new situation, basically by 
saying, "And so on", where the inquirer is instructed to continue to apply the method 
prescribed in the theory. Moral theories are thought of as practical reasoning, with 
algorithms fit to provide answers for any circumstances. So you either try to generate a 
rationally necessary moral universal law, or do more calculations about the likely 
consequences of whatever, as the case may be and, if you go on long enough, the answer will 
come out QED. 
ln many ways the classical views of morals are the counterpart to the doctrine of 
precedents and stare decisis in the rule of law. This is the doctrine in common law that once 
a case has been finally decided that decision must not be disturbed, and once established it 
constitutes a precedent authority for subsequent cases in lower courts, such that they must 
conform with the precedent, or demonstrate a difference which is significant enough to 
warrant a departure. The supposed justification for the doctrine of precedents is threefold: 
first, it establishes certainty - it provides fair warning - giving people a way of knowing 
what is legally required of them; second, like cases are treated alike; and, third, there is a 
finality in any given case. But notice that even when a precedent is not followed it still 
2 Above n 1. 
Kant, Above n l, 46. 
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remains (albeit with a narrowed scope of application), to be determinative of subsequent 
cases that are like it in the relevant respects, whatever they may be - finding the difference 
means that the earlier case is not a precedent for the current matter. The new decision is an 
addition to the body of law; the whole body is consistent, at least in principle. 
So, once determined, precedents acquire a hallowed status, the law on the point has been 
fixed. Some argue that it has always been fixed, that the courts merely discover or disclose 
the true nature of law. These kinds of view are the so-called "Natural Law" theories which 
generally hold that law exists independent of any particular decision.4 Natural Law 
supporters tend to hold that law and morals are inseparable. Modern Rights theories tend 
to be versions of Natural Law theories. For instance, in Stephen Guest's exposition of his 
philosophy of law Ronald Dworkin is said to identify himself within the Natural Law 
tradition.5 Such views construe rights as the corollaries of duties, and thus are Kantian in 
style. 
Other people argue that although it is important to have the features of fixity, notice and 
equality, the law is not discovered or disclosed like so much natural science, but is 
"determined" or posited, by people - especially, judges -who establish the precedents. Judges, 
it is held, are not like a palaeontologist discovering a previously unknown dinosaur, but a 
bit like the priest declaring the couple to be man and wife,6 although judges must also 
interpret the history of their own institution - the precedents - along with the governing 
legislation, apply them to the facts as found and then issue a judicial decision? The law-
makers adopt a formal stance and concomitant roles in the appropriate forum with the 
appropriate trappings and enact legislation which, if constitutional niceties are duly met, 
subsequently becomes the law of the land. Historically this kind of approach in legal 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Natural law theories prevailed in English common law until well into the 19th century. A major 
exponent of the school in English jurisprudence was of course Blackstone, against whose writings 
Bentham was to fulminate so successfully. It is associated also with classical approaches to 
international law following Grotius, along the lines of the Roman law of jus gentium. It is easy to see 
how law could be thought of as natural given the views about the status of the sovereign, as 
having Divine right, or of the Pope as the pontiff - literally the bridgehead [to heaven]- any 
prescribed law will trace back ultimately to God. 
S Guest Ronald Dworkin (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1991) 7. 
The performative nature of the official action, circumscribed by all kinds of social conventions 
and role requirements is key here. J L Austin's discussions of performatives is still relevant to this 
approach. See his How To Do Things With Words (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962). 
Judgment-making as an exercise in discovery and interpretation is the subject matter of a very 
recent publication. See Bruce Anderson "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making (Dordrecht, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1996). 
229 
230 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
thinking is identified with the Legal Positivists, most of whom owe their allegiance to 
Bentham and to the utilitarian school of ethics, and most of them were supporters of 
codifying the law. They separate law from morals, in the sense that they hold it is one thing 
to inquire whether a certain proposition is a statement of law, and an entirely different 
thing to ask whether it is good law.8 The consequence of the positivist approach is that law 
is seen as made up, not discovered, although the rules and procedures for valid rule-making 
must pre-exist the exercise.9 
B Moral Marksmen and Mathematicians 
Whereas in law it is at least an ongoing issue whether or the extent to which law is 
discovered as distinct from "made-up as we go", there is a sense of repugnance at the thought 
that we should be inventing ethics. For the Kantian it is as though there were a great pre-
existing universe of moral certainties just waiting to be identified and revealed. All we need 
to do is find the appropriate trajectory and we will be able to discover the right, the true 
answer. The appropriate trajectory, of course, will be the one that sends back the right 
answer, and for Kant that is the universalisability test. This will provide the moral 
counterpart to natural laws - it will disclose or reveal what was there all along. The moral 
marksman simply has to see whether her maxim falls in the circle of universal moral 
prescript, and if it does then she has scored a moral bull's eye. If her maxim fails the 
universality test, then hers is not a moral law at all and she must try again, if she is to act 
morally.l0 But, the problem seems to be that the Kantian moral marksman has to perform 
blindfolded. She has no prior knowledge of the whereabouts of the target, only the method 
for determining successful shooting. But if the Kantian is like a blindfolded marksman, the 
8 
9 
Unlike the Natural Law theorists, Legal Positivists acknowledge an immoral, objectionable item as 
law provided it meets the rules for valid law-making in that society. This is an implication of the 
separation of law and morals. This topic is addressed in famous debates involving H L A. Hart in 
the 1950s; see H L A Hart Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1958) 71 Harvard Law 
Review 592 and L Fuller Positivism and Fidelity to Law- A Reply to Professor Hart, (1958) 71 Harvard 
Law Review 630. I think one needs to bear h1 mh1d how relatively recent were the horrors of 
Germany's ethnic purification and genocidal policies and actions durh1g the War, and the 
defences of "only followh1g orders" at the Nuremberg trials to get a full sense of the importance of 
the issue of the connection between law and morals. 
The distinction here is between primary rules and secondary rules in H LA Hart's sense. See H L 
A Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961). 
10 Elsewhere in the Grundlegung (above n 1) and in the Critique of Practical Reasoning (New York, 
Garland Pub, 1976) Kant discusses at length the difference between prudential reasonh1g, which 
is purposive, (the hypothetical practical imperative), and categorical reasoning, the categorical 
imperative. He will have no truck with the view that casts prudence as a form of moral 
reasoning, if only because it is h1extricably bound up with purposes and ends. Prudence may be a 
good practice to adopt for certain purposes, but it has no independent value in Kant's eyes and so 
lacks the impartiality he demands. 












